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Abstract—Anomaly detection techniques for identifying com-
promised user credentials in an enterprise network are an impor-
tant research problem, garnering much attention within industry
over recent years. One important aspect of the research problem
is peer-based user analysis. A method based on recommender
system algorithms is proposed here, quantifying when a user
activity is unlikely based on the behavior of similar users.
Building several recommender system algorithms for separate
user activities provides an additional advantage of allowing for
different peer group structures depending on the user activity
being considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting compromised or rogue users in an enterprise
network continues to be a challenging and important problem.
The latest 2016 Verizon Data Breach report [1], claimed that
63% of data breaches involved stolen user credentials. Further-
more, insider threat continues to be a growing problem, and
is often the hardest form of credential misuse to detect. Tra-
ditional intrusion detection techniques are largely rule-based
requiring specific threat signatures, which can be ineffective
when dealing with increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks,
both from external and internal actors. Anomaly detection
and machine learning techniques for identifying compromised
users within a network have gained popularity both within the
academic community [2]–[4] and more recently in industry
where they are commonly referred to as user behavior analytics
(UBA).
With UBA the goal is to model the behavior patterns of
users within the network and then predict which activities are
unlikely, both with respect to the activity of the individual
user and that of their peers. Peer-based analysis is extremely
important with any UBA system to both reduce false alarms
and detect when users are behaving anomalously with respect
to their peers. In industry, peer groups are often formed using
directory groupings or human resources information and these
global peer groups are assigned across all user activities. A
more robust approach would be to learn peer groups based
on users displaying similar behavior as observed in the data
and allow for different groupings of users depending on the
activity or feature of the data being analyzed and then detect
anomalies with respect to the inferred peer groups.
This article proposes the use of recommender systems for
peer-based anomaly detection, with separate instantiations of
the algorithm for different features of the data. Recommender
systems are widely used for predicting the ‘rating’ or ‘pref-
erence’ a user will give an item, based on historical data
about which items the user has consumed, where consumed
could refer to a number of actions such as rating, clicking
or viewing. Collaborative filtering approaches specifically aim
to predict a user preference by exploiting similarity to other
users through the items that they consume. So far, the use of
recommender systems for anomaly detection has been under
utilized, although notably in [5] a nearest neighbor based
algorithm is utilized for anomaly detection on bipartite graphs.
In this paper a specific collaborative filtering algorithm
developed in [6] is employed, where a Poisson factorization
model is used for recommendations. In particular, two user
activities are considered: the processes run by the user, and
machines on which users authenticate.
Section II reviews the model presented in [6], and Section
III explains how the fitted model can be used for anomaly
detection. Section IV introduces the motivating data set and
presents the results of the analysis.
II. POISSON RECOMMENDATION
For n users and m items, let Y ∈ Nn×m0 be a matrix of
counts, where element Yui is the random variable for the num-
ber of times the user u invoked process i, or authenticated to
machine i. These data can be modeled using a k-dimensional
Poisson factorization model, where each item i and user
u are represented by non-negative k-vector latent factors
θu = (θu1, . . . , θuk) and βi = (βi1, . . . , βik) respectively. The
counts Yui are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with
mean given by the dot product of the latent variables,
Yui ∼ Poisson(θu · βi).
To capture diversity in the activity levels across the user
and item populations, [6] use hierarchical gamma priors for
the latent factors
θuj
iid∼ Gamma(a, ξu), j = 1, . . . , k, ξu ∼ Gamma(a′, b′),
βuj
iid∼ Gamma(b, ηi), j = 1, . . . , k, ηi ∼ Gamma(c′, d′),
(1)
so that the hyperparameters ξu and ηi correspond to overall
activity levels for user u and item i.
Given an observed user-item matrix of counts Y , inferen-
tial interest is focused on the marginal posterior distribution
[θ,β|Y ], since this underpins the predictive distribution on
which user-item pairs are likely to be observed in the future.
Since the posterior does not have a closed-form solution,
[6] uses variational inference which is an optimization-based
technique providing analytic approximations to intractable
posterior distributions for complex models. The mean-field
variational algorithm from [6] will be utilized here using the
code provided at https://github.com/premgopalan/hgaprec, and
the reader is referred to [6] for details.
III. ANOMALY DETECTION
The problem statement with respect to anomaly detection
is to determine if the observed user-item pairs over some
time period are considered normal with respect to the model
learned over some training period or if they can be considered
anomalous. For user u and item i, an observed count yui
during a testing period is given an anomaly score equal to
the upper tail probability of yui given the posterior expected
values of the latent factors, θˆu and βˆi,
pui = Pr(Yui ≥ yui|θˆu, βˆi). (2)
Note that this serves as a computationally tractable approxima-
tion to the true posterior predictive upper tail p-value, which
again does not have a closed-form solution.
Given a sequence of observed counts across items for a
user, yu1, . . . , yum, the p-values (2) can be combined to give
an overall anomaly score for each user. Fisher’s method is
commonly used to combine p-values obtained from indepen-
dent tests into the single test statistic
Xu = −2
m∑
i=1
log(pui).
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, Xu ∼
χ22m. Outlying behaviors correspond to large values of Xu,
and so a single combined p-value
pu = Pr(Xu > xu). (3)
from the upper tail of χ22m represents a measure of surprise
for each user u.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Los Alamos National Laboratory network host logs
The data set used for analysis is taken from an internal
collection of host logs over a two month period from comput-
ers running the Microsoft Windows operating system on Los
Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) enterprise network.
The data are available from http://csr.lanl.gov/data/cyber1/ and
[7] provides a detailed description of the data.
In the test month of data considered here, there are 91
known user credentials which were compromised during a
month-long red team exercise within the LANL network. The
aim of the analysis is to detect these compromised credentials
using the Poisson factorization approach.
In particular, two features of user behavior will be analyzed:
the processes invoked by the user, and the computers in the
network on which they authenticated. For this analysis, interest
focuses on what [6] refers to as the “implicit” data, whereby
observation of the count matrix Y is treated as censored [8],
recording only whether Yui = 0 or Yui > 0. Two data sets are
considered:
• User-Process, a binary matrix with n = 8,786 users and
m = 11,571 processes. There are 360,065 observations
over a 1 month training period and 385,631 observations
over a 1 month test period when the red team exercise
occurred. For the process names some standardization
was performed whereby version numbers were removed
from the process name so that processes running with
different versions were mapped to the same process.
• User-Authentication, a binary matrix with n = 9,232
users and m = 12,750 computers with a total of 69,697
observations over the 1 month training period and 69,526
observations over the 1 month test period when the red
team exercise occurred.
Any users or items that were present in the test period and
not in the training period were removed from analysis. In
future work, the inference procedure should be extended to
deal with the arrival of new items, such as utilizing content-
based recommendation algorithms as in [9].
The variational inference algorithm requires a validation
set to determine convergence of the algorithm, so following
[6] 1% of all training observations were set aside. Note that
unlike traditional test sets used for recommender systems,
observations in the test set will overlap those in the training
set.
B. Anomaly detection results
Prior parameter settings were chosen so as to maximize the
posterior predictive likelihood on the held out validation set
resulting in the number of latent variables k = 10 for the User-
Authentication data set, k = 50 for the User-Process data set
and the prior parameters specified in (1) as a = b = a′ = c′ =
.5, b′ = d′ = .01.
For evaluation of the Poisson model fit, an N -precision
statistic is calculated for each user in the test set, with the
91 known compromised credentials removed. For each user a
list of the top N recommendations are generated, ordered in
terms of the dot products θu · βi, i = 1, . . . ,m. The precision
for user u is then the proportion of those recommendations
which are subsequently observed during the test period.
Figure 1 shows the average N -precision, for different N ,
across the users as a function of user activity for both the User-
Authentication and User-Process data. As might be expected,
the precision for users who are least active is much worse than
users with a higher activity level. The precision performance
is better for recommending processes than authentications; a
reason for this could be that the most common processes will
be run by almost all users; whereas the machines which users
authenticate to will be much more sparse and diverse. This
can be seen in Figure 2, which compares the popularity of
different processes and the machines that users authenticate
on.
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Fig. 1. Mean precision for users with varying levels of activity
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Fig. 2. Log-log plot of the empirical distribution of the popularity of processes
and machines which users authenticate on.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
T
ru
e 
P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Authentications
Processes
Combined
Fig. 3. Red team ROC curve for the processes, authentications and combined
scored.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the ROC curve for the sequence
of p-values (3) for the User-Process data, User-Authentication
data, and the combined score, where the combined score is
taken as the average of the p-values of from the process data
and the authentication data. The number of true positives in
the top N most anomalous users, as a function of N , is given
in Table I. The performance is best for the User-Authentication
data, indicating much better signal for this particular red-team
exercise in looking at which machines users authenticated on.
The goal of a red-team exercise is often to steal privileged
user credentials and traverse the network, which would result
in more signal in looking at machines that users authenticated
on, rather than the processes they ran.
C. Conclusion
A collaborative filtering approach based on Poisson factor-
ization is proposed for peer-based anomaly detection of users
TABLE I
Top N detections
True positives 5 10 25 50 100
Processes 0 1 1 3 4
Authentications 3 4 12 17 25
Combined 1 2 5 9 22
in an enterprise network. The methodology is shown to per-
form well in detecting compromised user credentials. Future
work is to extend the model using content-based filtering for
new items observed in the network as mentioned in Section
IV-A; utilizing content would also enhance performance for
predicting known processes as the characteristics of a process,
such as its parent process or its source directory will cluster
items with similar properties. One problem associated with
recommender systems is that they struggle to predict items
used by only one individual in the network; as can be seen
in Figure 1, this is a common attribute of these data where
there are many processes and machines used by only a single
user. Future research will seek to use the posterior parameters
learned using the recommender system as an informative prior
for a multinomial-Dirichlet model on users and items, as in
[10]. The multinomial-Dirichlet distribution can provide an
extra layer to model an individual user’s profile, and the
informative prior from the recommender system should give
better predictive probabilities for new items for the user based
on the behavior of similar users.
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